Symbolic analysis of crypto-protocols based on modular exponentiation
Abstract
Automatic methods developed so far for analysis of security protocols only model a limited set of cryptographic primitives (often, only encryption and concatenation) and abstract from low-level features of cryptographic algorithms. This paper is an attempt towards closing this gap. We propose a symbolic technique and a decision method for analysis of protocols based on modular exponentiation, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We introduce a protocol description language along with its semantics. Then, we propose a notion of symbolic execution and, based on it, a verification method. We prove that the method is sound and complete with respect to the language semantics.
@InProceedings\{boreale.buscemi:symbolic-analysis-crypto-protocols,
author = \{M. Boreale and M. Buscemi},
title = \{Symbolic analysis of crypto-protocols based on modular exponentiation},
booktitle = \{Proc. of MFCS 2003},
year = \{2003},
volume = \{2747},
series = \{Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
publisher = \{Springer},
url = \{http://mikado.di.fc.ul.pt/repository/boreale.buscemi_symbolic-analysis-crypto-protocols.pdf}
}
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