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Symbolic analysis of crypto-protocols based on modular exponentiation

M. Boreale and M. Buscemi


Automatic methods developed so far for analysis of security protocols only model a limited set of cryptographic primitives (often, only encryption and concatenation) and abstract from low-level features of cryptographic algorithms. This paper is an attempt towards closing this gap. We propose a symbolic technique and a decision method for analysis of protocols based on modular exponentiation, such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange. We introduce a protocol description language along with its semantics. Then, we propose a notion of symbolic execution and, based on it, a verification method. We prove that the method is sound and complete with respect to the language semantics.

  author = \{M. Boreale and M. Buscemi},
  title = \{Symbolic analysis of crypto-protocols based on modular exponentiation},
  booktitle = \{Proc. of MFCS 2003},
  year = \{2003}, 
  volume = \{2747}, 
  series = \{Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, 
  publisher = \{Springer}, 
  url = \{}

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